., c over every case, the be st infornnation available sho,uld be applied, thus reducing the probability of an accident. As nnany safety factors as possible should' be built into the equipnnent itself, so that the degree of safety will always be the sanne'regar~less of who use~ the equipnnent.
The requirennent for safety is a continuing thing, and nnust continu- ally be reviewed as new infornnation and techniques beconne available or as changes are made in de sign or operation.
UCRL-3508 THE AMOUNT OF SAFETY EFFORT
The question, "How much safety effort is r~quired?" is difficult to
answer. It depends on many factors, among which are these:
1. Magnitude of a possible accident. The 'safety requirement for equipment " that may cause large disasters is obviously greater than for equipment that would produce small accidents~ 2. Duration of hazard. The length of time during which the risk is present may fnfluence its importance.
3. Location of hazardous equipment. If hazardous equipment is used in a densely populated area, more safety precautions are required than if it.
wer'e located in an isolated area~ 4. Price paid for an accident. If the cost of an accident would be death or injury, then 'more safety is required thanif only cost or delay were involved.
On an important program, however, where schedules must be maintained, extreme safety precautions may be employed to reduce the risk of delay.
5. Operating personnel. Regardless of the amount of time spent in designing for safety, and how well the probabilities of an accident are known, the actual degree of sa~ety depends finally upon the intelligent execution of the safety and operatlng procedures by informed per sonne!.
6. Safety codes. Safety codes are important for the determination of how much safety is required. These act as guides, and aid in establishing the dollar cost of safety. However, they represent a minimum acceptable standard, and--as with any standard--they force safety improvement on some but may. blunt the judgment of others so that they become less safe.
A safety code is better used as an aid than as ~ crowbar.
7. Probability of an accident. When a device is well understood and has been in existence a long time~-forexamp~e, a fired steam-pressure vessel --the causes and probabilities of accidents are well known. A boiler code exists that is tailored to fit boiler problems.
In the design and operation of hydrogen bubble chambers, however, there is very little experience: some of the properties of liquid hydrogen are not knownj and existing safety codes are not part~cularly applicable.
This make s it very difficult to estimate the probability of an accident, and requires much effort toward understanding the principles and operation of the bubble chamber .... and of the safety devices employed. For accidents involving liquid hydrogen, however, the diagram cannot be constructed exactly, because the probability of an accident is difficult to determine in a field that is, as yet, without statistical records.
Estimating aU the failures that can be thought of, going carefully over every item of equipment and studying what may happen if any component faHs or is misoperated, permits determination of what it will cost to correct the conditions considered. How safe a new system is cannot be determined, because or the high probability of errors of omission in estimating or in designing, but the cost of applying various known safety improvemend is quite definite.
The shape of the curve shown here has been estimated: however, it is based on the experience that a little thought doe s a lot of good, and that, regardless of how much money is spent, a system will never be perfectly safe. ~or this example the probability of minor accidents is shown to be greater than that of major accidents; however, these probabilities depend on the particular case, and could be reversed. Again, (the lines would not be sharp, as the transition from minor to major accidents is gradual and continuous. 
« AMOUNT SPENT. FOR SAFETY MU-12857 . and boiling can occur if a glass window breaks. From the time when the bubble chambers were de signed, it has been as sumed that the glas s might fail unexpectedly; therefore the design must be such that the eqUipment will remain in a safe condition throughout the events following the glass failure.
On the· 10Min. bubble chamber the chamber is surrounded by an in ... sulating vacuum; if a glass fails, the pressure in the liquid instantly equalizes with the vacuum-tap.k pressure. This sudden change in pressure, besides causing the phenomenon described above, also permits the gas to heat by 
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MU-12858 If the bottom glass on the 10-in. bubble chamber breaks and the liquid hydrogen is dropped onto the bottom of the vacuum tank, which is at room temperature, the liquid boils so fast that an explosive gas formation occurs. This instantaneous formation of gas raises the pressure so rap-~ idly that it was questionable whether the vent system would carry away the gas fast enough to prevent the rupture of the vacuum tank.
Therefore, before the 10-in. bubble chamber was put into operation, In the 72-in. bubble chamber the vacuum-t?-liquid ratio is about nine, as compared with eleven for the 10-in. chamber. Since these are of the same order of magnitude, pressures of the same order might be expected with comparable vents. Should the hydrogen shield fail to hold the 2.5-atmos pressure previously described, the vacuum would be broken,and fast boiling would cause a high pressure i~ the vacuum system. The 72-in.
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vacuum system i!5 de'signed, however, to withstand 14 atmos at the yield point.
The gas' vented during the early runs was not ignited, but allowed to vent to the atmosphere. During one of the runs in this test there was a spontaneous explosion after the hydrogen left the vent and mixed with air.
The only damage was the burn'ing of some wire insulation and some rags in the immediate area. A guess as to the cause is a static discharge. On the succe ssi ve runs in this te st the hydrogen was burned, and it was during this period that it was decided that the bubble chamber group would burn all large amounts of discharged ~ydrogen, rather than let it mix with air and risk the pos sibility of an explo~ion.
The burning of the intentionally ignited gas was very impressive.
The flame came out about 40 ft from the vent and lasted only about 1.25 sec from the start to finish. This was 6 liters of liquid hydrogen that was burned, and the heat was felt 100 ft away. Impressive as the flame was, the noise was very small compared with the blast ~hat ignited spontaneously.
It'was decided to burn the gas relea~ed in cycling the chamber, and thus to have known conditions, rather than allowing free hydrogen to escape into the atmosphereahd ignite in some unknown location, possibly with an shock wave compresses the gas mixture, which ra:isesthe pressure Pl. 
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Cl.
-. pipe vs. length-to-diameter ratio. Axial pressure measured at one end; ignition at other end. Initial pressure is zero psig' with both ends closed.· Pressure value corresponds to that of the thickest disk that would rupture, plus one-half of the pressure that almost ruptured the disc of the next greater thickness.
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In recent experiments at UCRL pressures of 1200 psig have been obtained many times in a 3-in. pipe 20 it long with 300/0' hydrogen in air at 1 atmos and ambient temperature.
Because of this possibility of detonation, it is recommen,ded that the' water seal be located within about 5 it of the flame so that a detonation wave' cannot be generated, or that the yent line be :q:lade sufficiently strong to withstand the wave. This can usually be done with ordinary schedule -40 steel pipe.
In the UCRL system, that part of the vent line that isbet.ween the vacuum tank and the wate·r seal, is believed to be the safest becaus'e it normally contains hydrogen, nitrogen: purge gas, or a mixture of these, and does not contain a known ignition source. However, to prevent detonations in this sectio~ the vent line can be designed to break up a shock wave per-
iodically, as determined by the LID ratio, and thus have to ~onta,~n only simple'combustion pressures.
Rupture disc,s and vent pipes will relieve pressure if the rate of pres sure rise is slow, as in combustion. 7 But the rate 9J .pressure rise can be so fast that the whole vessel is subjected to the high pressure 'before the disc fails; this can occur during detonation.. In this case .a r-qpture disc doe s not relieve the 'pres sure soon enough and the ves sellTIust withstand the de- An alternate vent design is to omit the water-seal tank anq introduce the natural gas into the safety vent at a point near the v~cuum tank so that the gas flows through the whole vent line and purges it. This method is also used by industrial plants for burning waste gas.
The effectiveness of the vent system was demonstrated by an incident during the operation of the 10-in. bubble chamber. The 180-psig rupture disc between the expansion line and the vent system failed, causing' a sudden drop of pressure in ,.the bubble chamber (Fig. 3 ) . About 4 liters' of the 8 liters in the chamber boiled almost instantly. The gas reached supersonic speed for a part of the tim,eas it traveled, literally screaming, ,through the vent pipe: When the hydrogen gas reachecf the flame it burned with a big whoosh, estimated at les s than a second, and with a flame estimated as from 10 to ZO it: hig:h. The, vent system functioned properly and there was ne> damage to any equipment. ' The rupture disc was replaced' and the run continued.
This event was a good test, and provided proof that these safety features are really needed and that they doprotect personnel and equipment; When iiquid-hydrogen experimental ap'paratus is used,' safety de-
, pends upon' c.ontrol of the hydrogen, ventilation,' and the ignition Sources.
Contr 01 of the hydrogen is effected in the equipment by ke~pingt:h:e hydrogen away from air and by ';'entingand bu~ning' any ~oil~ off h)"di~gen gas outside and away from the build,ing. H:ydrog~n g~s bottles and piping should be monitored for leaks, and kept outside if possible.
The transfer of liquid hydrogen from its shipping dewar to the apparatus is perhaps th~ weakest link in the whole safety chain, since gas escapes freely when dewars are changed. The possibility offor'~ation of an ice' ' plug ina dewar; causing the pressure to build up and th~ dewar to burst,
should be guarded against.
Jl:
Before liquid hydrogen experimental apparatus is introduc'ted into an e~isting building, inspection should be made to discover ignition~oti. The 72-in. bubble chamber will have its own building (Fig. 1,0) for., assembly, maintenance, and some physics experiments~l It is to be de-' signed and built wi,th particular regard for hydrogen hazards. Hydrogen test equipment and bubble chambers to be used in the building will be designed to comply with Group B, Class I, Divis'ion II.' Among the specifications are these:
Floor. Conducfing concrete.
Walls. Frangible, but such that panels hinge, and do not fly from building~
The wan between the high bay and the low bay shall be fireproof reinforced concrete.
Windows. Thin plastic blowout type.
Ventilation. Natural.
The highest part of the building shall have permanent openings distributed the length of the building to permit natural ventilation. Windows, shutter s, or other .obstructions to ventilation shall not be placed over these openings.
Ventilation. Two-speed forced-draft:
Normal speed: -1 change every 3 min.
Eme~gency speed -1 change every !l}in ..
Motors may be located outside the building on the roof to obviate explosion-proof construction. They must, however, be a totally enclosed . 3 -phase squir reI-cage induction type. A hydrogen-detection device shall be used that will automatically ,switch the ventilation system to high speed when hydrogen is detected. Manual push buttons complying with Group D, Class I, Division I shall be located in the high bay area and in the control room.
Roof. Designed so there are no pockets to trap hydrogen.
Lighting. Explosion-proof, Group B. Class I, Division I.
Heating. Stearn ..
Grounding Circuit. Ground straps shall be provided at all benches' and work areas~ along the dado line on walls (to be connected to the project grounding ,system). r..
. ,
' .
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Utility Power. The utility power for the area shall be distributed in blocks so that during hydrogen experiments all unnecessary power can be de-energized at the control room. For example, a block could be located every 20 ft along the wall. In the ~reas where there may be hydrogen" all equipment using power shall comply with Class I, Division II.. The utility power circuits shall comply with Clas s I, Division II.
Convenience Outlets. A separate c,ircuit of nonhazardous, 3-prong, twistlock convenience outlets sllall be installed every 10 feet. ' . This circuit sha!,l be de~energized by a switch 'in the control room when hydrogen is used.
Lightning Rods. Shall be provided.
The building will h'ave also a hydrogen compressor room designed to the same safety standards., A shop and control room are also a part of the building and are to be isolated with reinforced concrete walls. (The shop and control room are isolated in nonhazardous areas and therefore do not have any special safety features.) The doors on the building are to be arranged so that during hydrogen experiments the entry of personnel can be controlled. The doors will also be arranged for easy escape.
Safety Survey
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A safety survey should include:
1. A description of the system, consisting of 
